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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.J. BRACI{EN LEE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.STATE OF l'TAH, BOARD OF STATE
CAN'TASSER.S. SHER~fAN J. PREECE,
State Auditor, ::'1Hl \V ALTER L. BUDGE,
1\._ttorney General, SID LAMBOURNE,
State Treasurer, members of the Board
of State Canvassers,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
9439

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANTS
XATl~RJ~

OF CASE

The question presented is \Yhef1er Article VII, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah \':as validly adopted by the electorate of the State on November
8, 1960, and \vhether it is in full force and effect, or
\vhether it \Yas not properly adopted or is other,vise void
and of no effect.
1
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DISPOSITION BEFORE LOWER COURT
Upon joint motions for summary judgment (R. 25,
26), the trial court ruled, that Article VII, Section 24
of the Utah State Constitution, submitted to the electorate for adoption on November 8, 1960, being proposed
Constitutional Amendment Number One on the ballot of
November 8, 1960, was null and void and of no force and
effect, and entered its decree on July 26, 1961, so declaring. (R. 27, 28).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants and appellants seek reversal of the
trial court's determination that Article ·y·Ir, Section 2-±
of the Utah Constitution is null and void, and a declaration that it is valid and in full force and effect.

STATEMENT OF F_A_CTS
On December 28, 1960, the plaintiff filed an action
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, seeking a judgn1ent declaring that the proposed Constitutional Amendlnent Ktunber One, sub1nitted
to the electorate at the general election held on X ove1nber
8, 1960, and declared adopted by the defendants as nlelnbers of the State :Board of Election Canvassers, "~a 8 null
and void. (R. 1-10). Thereafter. a 1notion to dis1niss ,Yas
filed by the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing to bring the action, and that the
court was other,vise 'vithout jurisdiction over the subject
matter. (R. 19). The n1otion "~as argued on February
2
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13, 1961, and denied on ~lareh 1, 1961. (R. 20). Thereafter this Court denied on interlocutory appeal and the
defendants filed an ans\vPr to plaintiff's complaint. (R.
17).
The facts upon which the decision of the lower court
'vas based were stipulated to by the parties for the purposes of summary judgment. (R. 21).
It appears that during the 1959 session of the Utah
Legislature a joint resolution was adopted purporting to
amend Article VII of the Utah c·onstitution by adding a
ne\v Section 24 to provide for the ''continuity of state
and local government operations in periods of emergency
resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack'.' (R.
22). The resolution, in full, read (R. 22):
"Not\vi thstanding any general or special provisions of the Constitution the legislature, in order
to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack,
shall have the power and the immediate duty (1)
to provide for prompt and temporary succession
to the powers and duties of public offices, of \\Thatever nature and \vhether filled by election or appointment, the incumbents of which may become
unavailable for carrying on the powers and duties
of such office, and ( 2) to adopt such other measures as 1nay be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations including, but not limited to the financing thereof.
In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred
the legislature shall in all respects conform to the
requirements of this Constitution except to the extent that in the judgment of the legislature so to
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

do would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay.
The Secretary of State is directed to su~mit
this proposed amendment to the electors of the
State of Utah at the next General Election in the
manner provided by la\v."
In addition, House Bills 83, 82 and and 81 were
passed by the Legislature and signed into la\V contingent
upon the adoption of the ne\v proposed constitutional
a1nendment relating to continuity of government. (R. 23).
These acts provided for e1nergency executive, legislative
and judicial officers, and for relocation of the seat of
government in the event of the necessity, due to enemy
attack or threatened attack. (R. 23-2±).
Thereafter, the joint resolution was published in a
newspaper in each county for a period of two months
before the election held on X oven1ber 8, 1960. (R. 22).
A ballot bearing two constitutional amendments \vas
sub1nitted to the electorate on ~\ ove1nber 8, 1960. The
a1nend.Inents were set off in blocks and entitled HConstitutional Amend1nent ::.\u1nber One" and~· Constitutional
An1endment Number T,\-o." Each block contained a space
to be marked "For" or HAgainst'' each proposed anlendment. Amend1nent Nun1ber One dealt \vith the continuity
of government provisions, and Arnend1nent Xun1ber Tw·o
\Vas concerned with tax exemptions ...A_ san1ple of the ballot is attached to plaintiff's co1nplaint. (R. 10-11). The
language of A1nendment Nun1ber One \Yas as follows:
"Shall Section 2± of .A.rticle \Til of the Constitution of the State of lTtal1, be a1nended to grant
~emporary emergency po\vers to the Legislature
1n the event of \var or en1ergency caused by "'"ar."
4
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At the election on ~\ oveutber 8, 1960, a total of 3i-±,981 persons cast ballot:s, 37-1:,609 persons voting in the
presidential race, 371,-tS9 persons voted in the gubernatorial race, and ~u:2,101 persons voted on Proposed
~t\.1nendment Nun1ber One. Out of the votes cast on the
.1\1nendment, 171,',~{)~ persons favored adoption of the
e:unendrnent and 120,339 opposed it. Approximately 58
percent of the voters voting on Amendment Number One
favored it. Slightly less than 46 percent of the total
persons casting votes on any issue at the general election
favored the amendrnent since not all voters voting at the
election cast a vote on the proposition contained in Proposed Amendment Number One. (R. 22). Based upon
the votes east, defendants declared the amend1nent
adopted.
The plaintiff sought to have the amendment declared
null and void on four bases. First,. that the number of
votes favoring adoption does not raeet the constitutional
requirements of Article XXIII relating to amendment
of the State Constitution. Second, that the amend1nent
was not a single amend.1nent, but 'vas in fact t'vo or Inore
arnendments, and was void for failing to be submitted
in such a manner as to allow th_e electors to vote on each
amendment separately. Third, that it was not submitted
to the electorate in proper form. Fourth, that the Proposed Amendment 'Yould contravene the provisions of
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing a republican form
of government and ,,. ould also contravene Article I, Section 2 of the State Constitution by removing the political
power from the people. It is submitted that an examination of each of these contentions will show them to be
5
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without merit, and that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment declaring Article VII, Section 24
to be null and void.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR WANT OF SUFFICIENT VOTES
FOR APPROVAL.
POINT II.
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 24, DID NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE XXIII, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BE
SEPARATELY SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS.
POINT III.
THE AMENDMENT WAS NOT DEFECTIVE FOR FAlLURE TO SUBMIT THE AMENDl\lEI~T TO THE ELECTORATE IN PROPER FORM.
POINT IV.
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4 OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION NOR AMEND OR CONTRADICT
ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
ARGl~~fEXT

POINT I.
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR WANT OF SUFFICIENT VOTES
FOR APPROVAL.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The plaintiff contends that the proposed amend1nent
was not properly adopted because there was an insuffieient number of votes cast in favor of the amendment. It
should be rememberd that in excess of 58 percent of those
persons who voted on the proposed amendment registered
their vote as favoring adoption, and that this was about
.fG percent of the vote cast. The question for decision,
then, is whether the Utah Constitution requires a majority of the persons voting thereon, or a majority of all
votes cast, no matter what issues are joined with the
amendment at the general election~
The proposed amendment "\vas the result of legislative action by joint resolution. It was not a proposal emanating from a Constitutional Convention. Article XXIII
of the Utah Constitution deals with amendment and revision. The three sections under that article provide
two means for amending the Constitution. Article XXIII,
Section 1, provides for amendment upon action of the
Legislature. Article XXIII, Sections 2 and 3 relate to the
other means of amending the Constitution, that being by
way of a specially called Constitutional Convention.
Since the proposed amendment was the result of a joint
legislative action, the provision for amending the Constitution that must determine if the amendment was
validly adopted is Article XXIII, Section 1, "\vhich provides:
"Any amend1nent or amend1nents to this Constitution may be proposed in either house of the
Legislature, and if two-thirds of all the members
elected to each of the two houses, shall vote in
favor thereof, such proposed amendment or
amendments shall be entered on their respective

7
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journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon;
and the Legislature shall cause the same to be
published in at least one newsp,aper in every
county of the State, where a newspaper is published, for two months immediately preceding the
next general election at which time the said
amendment or an1end~ents shall be submitted to
the electors of the State, for their approval or
rejection, and if a major'ity of the electors voti·1lg
thereon shall approve the same, such amendment
or amendments shall become part of this Constitution. If two or n1ore a1nendments are proposed,
they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each of them separately."
The pertinent part of this section is that referring
to the electors necessary for adoption. On this point the
section reads :

"'* * * if a 1najority of the electors voti.ng
thereon shall approve the sa1ne, such amendment
or amendments shall b2con1e nart of this Constitution."
.L

It is generally saiu that rules of statutory construction are applicable in assisting in eonst1·uing a constitution, B,adger v. If oidale, 88 ~--,.2d 208; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional La"T' Sec. 15, and in this regard, \\Tords are to be
given their natural, obvious or ordinary n1eaning. Sou.thEastern Underwriters Ass'n. c. U·nited States, 323 l .... S.
533; Genera.[ Electric Conzpany ~·. Thr,zfty Sales, 5 U.2d
326, 301 P.2d 7-1:1 (1956); 16 C.J.S., Constitutional La,Y,
Sec. 19.
In applying this maxim to the language of the l~tah
Constitution, it appears clear that "·hat 'vas intended ":oas
8
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that only a majority of the persons who voted on the issue
favor adoption to effect approval. In the case of Breckhause v. Hill, 268 S.W. 865 (Ark. 1925), the Arkansas
Supreme Court had before it a similar allegation to that
now urged by the plaintiff. In that case 125,700 persons
had voted on the gubernatorial issue, but only 52,000 to
56,000 votes were cast favoring the adopting of certain
constitutional amendments. The Arkansas Constitution
contained the words ''voting thereon" similar to that
of Utah. The court upheld the adoption of the amendments. Subsequently, in Coombs v. Gray, 281 S.W. 918
(Ark. 1926), the same court reaffirmed the interpretation.
In Battle Creek Brewing Co. v. Board of Sup·'rs. of Calhoun County, 131 N.,V. 160 (Mich. 1911), the Michigan
Supreme Court held the word's "voting thereon" meant
those who actually passed on the proposition and not just
those who cast blank ballots. In Keelams v. Compton,
206 S.W. 2d 498 (l\fo. 1947), the Missouri Supreme Court
said with reference to the plain meaning of the words
"voting thereon" as appeared in Article VI, Section 26
( 6) of the Missouri Constitution:
"In any event it has been definitely detel·mined that 'two-thirds of the qualified electors
* * * voting thereon, * * *' means 'two-thirds of
those who actually vote for or against the given
proposition, "\Yhether such two-thirds be two-thjrds
or not of all the voters taking part in the election
otherwise * * *.' '\r otes cast on the proposition'
and 'voting thereon' are to be construed in their
irdinary and usual sense and they mean 'expressing the 'vill, mind or preference; casting, or a
vote.' They do not include votes or ballots that do
not cast a vote on the proposition."
9
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Thus it would appear clear that the plain Inean_Ing
of Article XXIII, Section 1 would require only a maJority of the votes actually expressing an opinion or preference on the amendment.
If son1e persons desire not to vote on an issue, it
certainly is a fair inference that they leave the matter
to those who, in their discretion, see fit to pass on the
matter. In Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877),
it was said:
''This we understand to be the established
rule as to the effect of elections, in the absence of
any statutory regulation to the ·contrary. All
qualified voters \Yho absent themselves from an
election duly called are prestuned to assent to
the expressed will of the majority of those voting, unless the law providing for the election
otherwise declares * * *."
This is certainly the recognized majority rule. See 131
ALR 1382, where it is said:
"It seems that by the ,,~eight of authority
blank ballots are not to be counted in arriving
at the total vote cast for the purpose of deterinining a majority."
Applying these propositions to the question now before the
Court, is there any reason to assume other than that those
who did not vote on the proposed constitutional amendment left the proposition to those \Yho sa"~ fit to exercise
their franchise~ A p~erson is no less absent because
he fails to vote one \Ya~~ or the other on a ballot than if
he never appeared. In a de1nocracy the government IS
said to operate on the basis of the active participation of

10
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its citizenry. Certainly the founding fathers "\vould not
have intended a n1eaning that 'vould n1ake the result go
off on phlegmatic inactivity.
Other states having similar prov1s1ons have construed their constitutions contrary to the position no'v
urged by the plaintiff. ln Green v. Board of Canvasser ..,.
5 Idaho 130, 47 Pac. 259 (1896), the Idaho Supren1e Court
concerned itself '"ith Section 1, Article 20 of their
State Constitution, 'vhicl1 is less specific than that of
Utah. The Idaho provision read:

* if a majority of the electors shall ratify
the same, such amendment or amendn1ents shall
become a part of this Constitution."
'•* *

'l,he facts of the case disclose that a proposed constitutional amendment had not received approval fro1n the
tnajority of persons "Tl1o cast ballots at the general election, but had received approval from those who sa"~ fit
to vote on the issue. The Idaho Court, in answer to the
same contention as is made by plaintiff here, stated at
page 260 of 47 Pacific Reporter:

''* * * Experience has shown that it is almost,
if not quite, an impossibility to secure an e::~pres
sion fro1n every elector upon any question, and,
above all, upon a question of an amendment of the
constitution; and it is equally difficult to ascertain
the actual number of electors at any given tirne.
To rely upon the vote cast upon some other question at the same election would be entirely unsatisfactory, and such a construction is~ 've thin_k,
at least in1pliedly nu~atived by the provisions of
section 3. \Vhile it is true that some 10,000 or
more electors \\~otlld seem to have been entirely

11
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indifferent upon the question of the adoption of
this and the other amendments, still all weremust have been-fully advised as to the impor~
ance of the questions submitted, and sho~ld their
indifference be taken as conclusive of their opposition to the amendments~ Upon what rule of
honesty or righteousness can this be claimed~
Is it not more rea~onable, as well as mo~e righteous, to say that In a matter about which they
manifest such indifference their silence shall be
taken as assent~ We hold that the amendment
under discussion is adopted, and has become a
part of the contitution of the state of Idaho."
In Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 \\Tisc. 572, in reference to
the same argwnent urged here, the \)~isconsin Court
said:
"* * * Under the provisions of our consti tution, as 'veil as of other constitutions, persons are
elected to a particular office \vho have a majority
of the votes cast-not for the candidates for son1e
other office, but for the candidates for that office. Measures or la,Ys are also declared adopted
or rejected according as tLey receiYe or fail to receive each a Inajority of the votes cast for or
against it. To d'eclare a 1neasure or la'v adopted
or defeated - not by the nmnber of votes east
directly for or against it, but by the number cast
for and against son1e other 111easure. or for the
candidates for so1ne office or offire8 not connected
with the measure itself, "Tould not onlY be out
of the ordinary course of legislation, b~t, so far
as we lrnow, a thing unkno"Tn in the historY of
constitutional law. * * *"
'
It is submitted that as concerns the provisions of the
Utah Constitution, the 1natter is clearly against the
construction plaintiff proposes to give . .~rticle XXIII,

12
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Section 1. In. Re 'Jlodd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N.E. 865; DeSoto
Parrish v. lV,illianJ,~', 49 La.Ann. 422, 21 So 647.
Before laying this rnatter to rest it is well to note the
argument raised by plaintiff at trial below that Section
3 of Article XXIII, relating to adoption of amendments
or revision of the Constitution by requiring a' 'a majority
of the electors of the State voting at the next general
election" requires more than Section 1, and hence the
frarners couldn't have intended two different standards.
In Green v. Board of Canvassers, 5 Idaho 130 ,47 Pac.
259 (1896), the Idaho Court, when faced with the same
argument, rejected the contention that two different
standards could not have been intended, saying:

"* * * We kno\v of no rule of construction, nor
has our attention been called to any, that would
warrant us in arbitrarily saying that the language
used in the two sections was intended to mean
the same thing. On the contrary, the reason seems
to us to be the other way. We can understand
why the makers of the constitution should apply
a different and 1nore stringent rule in the adoption of a call for a constitutional convention fro1n
what they 'vould in the matter of a mere amendment. * * *"
On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Coombs v. Gray, 281 S.,V. 918 (Ark. 1926), agreed with
the general proposition that both sections should be
harmoniously construed, saying:
"It would be doing violence to the design of
the framers of the amendment to attribute to them
an intention to require less number of votes to
adopt an amend'lnent proposed by the people un-

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

der the power of the initiative than one submitted
by the legislature."
However, instead of saying a majority of those voting
at the general election must pass on the amendment, it
said only a majority of those who expressly vote on the
issue is needed to adopt an amendment.
The recorded proceedings of the Constitutional Convention provide a simple ans\ver to the Utah situation.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 were introduced at different times
and by different sponsors. Section 1 \Yas introduced by
Delegate Eichnor. Proceedings of Constitutional Co11r
venti·on, p. 157. Delegate Chidester introduced the provision relative to Sections ~ and 3. Op. cit., p. 113. The
Com1nittee on Amendments considered both sections and
favorably reported then1. Op. cit., p. :2-±3. On the floor
of the Convention, Section 1 of ~l.rticle XXIII was adopted \\'"ith no change being made relative to the provision
of "a majority of the electors voting thereon" being required for adoption. Op. cit., 406 .....\s to Section 1, it \vas
al\vays apparently conte1nplated that single a1nendments
would be submitted at a general election. HoweYer, such
was not the case as to an1end1nents by Constitutional
Convention. Thus Section 3, as introduced originally~
read:
"Any constitution adopted by such convention
shall have no validity until it has been sub1nitted
to and adopted by a n1ajority of the electors voting
at saild election."
A reading of the debate at pages 675-677 of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Inakes it clear
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that \vhat was intended "\Yas t\vo \\·ays of amending the
Constitution. First, by the action of the Legislature and
the electoratP a~., to single an1end1nents, and second, by
a Constitutional Convelltion \vith adoption of the revised
Constitution by a special election to be held for that purpose. Subsequently, Delegate Squires felt that a special
election \\Tould be too costly, and also there was concern
that possibly a Constitutional Convention would only
recommend one or two changes which could be handled
at a general election. Thus, Delegate Squires said "\vith
reference to the reason for changing the language of Section 3 from ''said election'' to "general election'':
""That was 1ny idea, to save the expense of a
special election on the subject."
Thus, the reason for the apparent difference between
Sections 1 and 3 of Article XXIII is apparently because
of the failure to note the distinction "\vhen the money saving change "\Yas 1nade. Thus the facts seem clearly to
support a contention that the framers intended only
that those persons \\Tho actually cast votes would be
counted in determining the numerical majority, where
the issue was voted on at a general election. As originally
contemplated by the Section 3 form of amendment, the
only persons casting ballots would be persons voting
on the convention issues, and there was no need for the
specific language used in Section 1 pertaining to general
elections. Thereafter, when the amendment was made,
the language relating to the required majority "\vas overlooked and not changed. Thus, it seems clear that the intention of the framers was to require only a majority
of the persons voting on the amendment cast votes in
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favor of it for it to be adopted, where a general election
is the means used to subn1it the matter to the voters.
It is submitted, therefore, that plaintiff's position
as to the required majority is not well taken, and no objection to Article VII, Section 24, can be raised with reference to its failure to achieve the requisite number of
affirmative votes.
POINT II.
THE PROPOSED AME1~DMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 24, DID NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE XXIII, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT PROPOSED Al\IENDMENTS BE
SEPARATELY SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS.

Plaintiff contends that the proposed constitutional
a1nendment violates Article XJ.:III, Section 1 of the l~tah
Constitution, which provides:
~·If

two or 1nore anzend/n!ents are proposed_.
they shall be so sub1nitted as to enable the electors
to vote on each of the1n separately.'~
In the instant case, t\vo a1nendl:nents ""ere proposed, towit : Article "\TII, Section 24, adding the continuity of
government provision, and a proposal to a1nend Section 2
of Article XIII, relating to tax exen1ptions; both of these
proposed a1nendments "~ere separately set out on the ballot in such a manner as to allow the voter to express himself separately .on each issue. It would appear clea.r then,
that unless Article "\TII. Section 24 \Yas in fact two amendments, that there was no violation of the constitutional
requirement.
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~I:'he

general rule of construction adopted with reference to constitutional provisions like that contained in
Article XXIII, Section 1, is that if a constitutional
amendment embracing several subjects, all of which are
gennane to the general subject of the amendment, is
adopted, it will be upheld. 6 RCL 30. As is said in 16
C.J .S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 9:
"In order to constitute more than one proposed amendment, within such a constitutional
provision, the propositions submitted must not
only relate to more than one subject, but 1nust
also have at least two separate and distinct Jnl rpo.ses not dependent on, or connecte:d w1.th, each
other, and although a proposed amendment embraces more than one subject, stttch subjects need
not be separately subm.itte.d to the elector.s. if they
are so concerned with, or dependent on, the general subject that it m~ght be undesirable that one
be adopted and not the other."
Jiany cases have recognized this rule. It is not necessary
that every possible change or abolition of the Constitution be set out for yea and nay ballot, but only those that
are in fact separate and distinct and not dep~endent or
connected \Yith one another. People ex rel. Elder v.
Sours. 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167 (1903); McBee v. Brady,
15 Idaho 161, 100 Pac. 97 (1909); Lobaugh v. Cook, 127
Io\va 181, 102 N.",V. 1121 (1905); Winget v. Holm, 187
~[inn, 78, 2-!-t X.\V. 331 (1932).
In the case of Kirby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d
549 (1934), the Supreme Court of Arizona spoke to the
matter and stated the constitutional requirement thus :
''We think amendments to the Constitution, which
the section above quoted requires shall be sub-
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1nitted separately, must be construed to mean
anten.dments which have different objects and purposes in view. In order to constitute more than
one a1nendment, the propositions subn1itted must
relate to more than one subject, and have at least
two distinct and separate purposes not dependent
.h each oth er ***"
upon or connecte d w1t
.
''If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment all cover matters necessary to
be dealt with in some manner, in order that the
Constitution as amended, shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic
embraced in that part which is amended, and if
logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a
"\vhole, then there is but one amendment submitted."
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida,
Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956), concerned the
interpretation of the sin1ilar provision of the Florida
Constitution concerning ho1ne rule of a local eounty. The
court said that the provisions for amendment of the
c:onstitution are mandatory, and further stated:
''In the City of Coral Gables v. Gary~ supra, "\Ye
took pains to relate that even though a proposed
amend1nent 1nay be separable into tzco or nzore
propositions concerning the t·alue of u·h£ch dirersity of opi-nion 1nay arise. that alone i.s 110f suffvcent to condernn it; provided, the propositions
1nay be logically vie,ved as having a natural relation a~d connect~on as component parts or aspects
of a s1ngle don11nant purpose. Unity of purpose
as revealed in the object sought by the a1nendment
iR the test; thl' details leading to it are not 1naterial. If several propositions that are unrelated
are subn1itted as one and cannot be reconciled as
such on any reasonable thesis, then they meet the
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condeu1nation of the constitutional Inandate. \v~ e
have no such situation here, local self-government
for Dade County is the only concern of the proposed an1endment."
[ t has also been said:
''This requirement necessitates the separate subInission of such amendments only as have different objects and purposes, becnuse se,l:eral changes
necessary to carry out a single purpose constitute
one amendment."

1() C.J.S. 59. See State v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 3901, 265
P.~d 4-1:7 (1953).
Having, therefore, framed the legal rule relating to
the con~~titutional requirement, is such rule violated when
applied against our present amendment~ Plaintiff argues that because the amendment provides:
· •X ot\\~ithstanding any general or special provi~ions of the Constitution the legislature, in order
to insure continttity of state and local government
operati'ons in periods of e1nergency 1·esulting frrnn
disasters caused by eneJJZY attack shall have the
po-vver * * * .",
that this e1npo\vers the Legislature to amend the Constitution and that every la\v passed (see H.B. 81, 82, 83,
1959 Legislature) works an amendment of the Constitution. Defundants disagree. It seeins obvious that only
subject is involved in the amendment, and that is the
preservation of government in periods of emergency
caused by enemy attack. A whole ne\v provision has been
added to the Constitution, all the provisions of the amend:alent relate to continuity of government, and all laws
passed under thi~ provision are thereby so limited.
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The amendment embraces only one homogenous subject - continuity of government in periods of disaster or
emergency due to enemy attack. It is clear then that the
single object test laid down by the courts has been met.
Any law passed contrary to such object would be invalid,
and although laws may be passed touching other subjects, their object is the same - continuity of government,
and no amendment of the Constitution takes place. As
was said in Continuity of Government, Executive Office
of the President, 1959, p. 9 :
"So, the power granted by the amendment is
broad. It could not be otherwise considering the
contingency to 'vhich it is addressed.
For all the breadth of the grant, however, the
amendment gives no blank check to the Legislature. On the contrary, the power is subject to
limitations. For one thing, they are implicit in
the structure of the amendment. Thus the amendment is phrased in terms of a grant of new power
(not removal of limits of existing po·u;ers) for the
attainment of a stated objective, namely: Cor~r
tinuity of governmental operations."
From this it can be seen that no objection to the
amendment exists from the standpoint of multiplicity.
Any deviation fro1n other constitutional provisions can
only be made to preserve the continuity of government
and apply the nevv po"Ters of the ne"T amendment. In
the nbsence of their application, all other powers continue to exist. See Continuity of Government, supra, p.
10, and the Federal Constitution stands as a bul\vark
against improper action. Op. Cit., p. 10.
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There is no need to consider whether any laws passed
by the Legislature are presently unconstitutional since
they are not before us; and to the degree they do not
conforn1 to the single object of the amendment would be
void in any instance. The amendment is rnerely an enabling provision and its central object is that of adding
to the Con8tituition powers of preservation by civil act ion, and avoiding the prospects of martial rule.
The instant amendment, therefore, is not void, since
it is a consistent and workable provision relating to one
single subject. Other provisions of the Constitution are
till ap·plicable except where disruption of the continuity
of government due to enemy attack would prohibit their
application, and in such an instance the provisions of
.A.rticle VII, Section 24, come into effect. The new amendInent does not vacate but supplements other provisions
of the Constitution by providing for a continuation of
civil government when no government might otherwise
exist.
POINT III.
THE AMENDMENT WAS NOT DEFECTIVE FOR FAlLURE TO SUBMIT THE AMENDl\iENT TO THE ELECTORATE IN PROPER FORM.

The Secretary of State was directed to submit the
proposed amendment, Article VII, Section 24, to the
electorate at the next general election, and the amendment was to be submitted in the manner provided by la\v.
J.R. 12 :Jiarch 1959, Section 2. Acting in accord \vith the
instructions appearing in the joint resolution, the Secretary of State caused the following proposition to be
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placed upon the ballot and submitted to the electorate
at the general election on November 8, 1960 :
"Shall Section 24 of Article \:II of the Constitution of the State of lJtah be amended to grant
temporary emergency powers to the Legislature
in the event of 'var or emergency caused by war."
Plaintiff urged in the trial court that for two reasons
this statement of the issue on the ballot renders the constitutional amendment invalid. First, because it purported to amend Section 24 Article VII when no such
section existed, and secondly because the word ",,. ar"
rather than attack was used in describing the amendment.
In considering the validity of the arguments raised by
plaintiff, it should be pointed out that Section 1, Article
XXIII of the State Constitution makes no specific provision as to how the particular amendment will be set out
on the ballot. The only reference in that section as to what
the Legislature should cause to be done after approving
the amendment is the following:
4

~

* * * and the legislature shall cause the san1e to

be published in at least one ne,vspaper in every
count)~ of the state for t,,~o Inonths in1n1ediately
preceding the next general election~ at "~hich time
the said amendment or amend1nents shall be subnlitted to the electors of the state * * * .''
It appears from the \\Tording of the a1nendlnent that
the founding fathers intended the voters to be appraised
of the contents of the constitutional a1nenillnent by ne". spaper notice; and that the ballot provide son1e 111 eans of
i<lPntif:Ying the amend1nent proposed and a n1eans of
approving or rejecting it. Section 20-11-19, U.C.A. 1953

'
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relating to the 1nanner of voting on public measures,
states:
HThe 1nanner of voting upon measures submitted
to the people shall be as follows :
The nu1nber and ballot title herein provided for
shall be printed upon the official ballot, with the
\rords •For' and "Against' immediately to the
right thereof, each followed by a square in \Yhieh
the elector 1nay place a cross to indicate his vote.
Electors desiring to vote "for' shall place a cross
\rithin the square following the word 'for,' and
those desiring to vote •against' shall place a cross
\\'"i thin the square follo,ving the \Vord 'against.' "
In the instant case the ballot title of the Continuity of
Government Amendment was set out as Constitutional
Amendment Number One, plus the above recited language, and a place to vote for and against set out on the
ballot. Although the above statute may be limited to
referendum or initiative, it appears that there can be
no objection for failure to follow the standard form of
~~nbn1itting matters to the "people".
The fact that the Constitution makes requisite the
publication of the proposed amendment in the ne\vspaper
cannot be passed too lightly. In the case of 811Aow v.
Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948), the Utah
Supre1ne Court \vas faced with an argument claiming to
invalidate a proposed adoption of a constitutional amendInent, because of a failure to post cards as required by
20-7 -±, U.C.A. 1953. The Supreme Court, in rejecting
the argument, stated:
"It should be remembered that the an1en~dment is
not printed in full on the ballot. It is 1netr:ely
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designated thereon by number and title, as. is previously indicated in this opinion. Such be1n? the
case, the notice of importance to_ the voter ts the
publi,cat.ion in the. newspapers pnor to the g_e·neral
election. This is the publication that perm1~s the
voter time to consider the merits or dements of
the proposed change. At most, the card in the voting booth could only be a helpful reminder of the
general sense of the proposed change. Failure of
the county clerk to furnish cards complete in all
details might be a violation of the statute, but it
would not prevent passage of the proposed joint
resolution.

lT nder our constitutional requirements, notice
must be carried in the newspapers, and if publication was of the complete proposed joint resolution including the provision for a delayed effective
date, then the mere fact that this date was not also
published on the cards does not require a holding
that the proposition to postpone has not been subnlitted to the voters. All voters throughout the
state are en ti tied to notice, and the fact that one
county clerk may or may not have included all of
the necessary information on the cards is not
fa tal to the passage of the complete resolution. If
our constitution or statutes made no provision for
general publication, and provided that it was
necessary that the proposed amendment and its
effective date be set out in full on the ballot, then
the failure to include the proposition of a delayed
date might constitute a failure to submit that portion of the propose~ .a_mendment to the people.
However, the probabilities and possibilities of the
voter being fully informed of the context of an
a_1ne~d1~ent are reasonably assured of the pubilcation Is In ~he newsp_apers. Accordingly. the 'tnethod of noh.ce prescr1.bed by the co'nSt:ifufl~on is o·ue
reason~1bly calculated to gve noh~ce to the voters
and thts 1n(_Jthod u:as here coJnplied 1rith. This i.._~
24
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u.;as sJtbmitted to the voters for approval or dissufficient to sustain a finding that the proposed
antendment including its delaye.d effective date
approval. * * *"

Thus, the Suprerne Court has clearly recognized that the
essential notice to the voters cornes not from the ballot,
but frorn the newspapers, and that the ballot merely
provides a vehicle for expressing the voters' feelings on
the issue. Adding to the argument that the ballot is to
provide nothing more than a vehicle for expressing favor
or disfavor on a proposed amendment is 20-3-41, U.C.A.
1953, which provides that Secretary of State shall, with
reference to such proposed amendments:
'' * * * certify the same to the county clerk of each
county, designating such arnendment or question
by number and also by a title which shall cover
the subject matter of the amendrnent or question
submitted* * *."
It is clearly manifest that what appears on the ballot need
be only a reference to the amendment sufficient to identify the subject matter so as not to confuse the voter as to
other similar propositions that may be on the ballot.
\Vhen considered in this light is becomes clear that the
proposed amendment was not faulty for failure to be
properly submitted to the electorate. It is clear that the
amendn1ent need' not be set out in full, Snow v. Keddington, supra; Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala. 230, 75 So. 988;
see 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law., p. 57, where it is said:
''The ballot need not contain the amendment in
full since it is presumed that every voter received
the benefit of notice through publication rn extenso of the proposed amendment."
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The rule is well stated by the Supreme c·ourt of Louisiana
in Hota~d v. City of New Orleans, 213 La. 843, 35 So.2d
752, where the court said:
"The second ground of attack upon the validity
of the constitutional amendment is that the voters
were not properly notified or informed of the contents or provisions of the amendment. All that
the Constitution-Section 1 of Article 21-requires in that respect is that the Secretary of
State shall cause the proposed amendment to be
published in a newspaper in each parish in which
a newspaper is published, twice within not less
than 30 days nor more than 60 days preceding the
election at which the amendment is to be submitted to the voters. It is admitted that the Secretary of State did cause this amendment to be
published in full in one newspaper in every parish
in the state, t".,.ice \Yithin not less than 30 nor
more than 60 days preceding the election at ,,. .hicb
the amendment was voted upon. It appears in
some of the briefs for the appellants- and was
revealed in their oral arguments-that they have
confused the 1nanner of submitting constitutional
amendments on the printed ballots \Yith the nlanner in which notice shall be given by publication
in the ne\\rspapers. The publication in the newspapers gves the voters full inforn1ation as to the
contents or provisions of a proposed constitutional amendment. All that is requtred to be
printed on the ballot is sufficient i~n.fornzation to
ident~ify the proposed anzendnzent which the voter
is voting for o·r against. * * *''
In applying this rule to the facts of this case and

'
recognizing that the statutory limitations of 20-3-41,
U.C.A. 1953, merely requires that the ballot refer to the

subject matter to be considered, it appears clear that the
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ballot was sufficient. The Constitution was being considered for amendment on two questions, one concerning
the amendment to preserve the continuity of government
in the event of enemy attack, and the other a tax exemption matter. It appears clear that as between the two
propositions under consideration, no confusion could
result. Plaintiff objects because the word "war" was
used rather than ''attack''. The words are not so dissimilar as to be confusing. Pearl Harbor was an attack;
would anyone deny it was not also war~ The similarity
of meaning is pointed up by comparing Webster's definition of attack:
"Act of falling on with force or violence,"
with that of war:
"'The state or fact of exerting force or violence
against another."
The dissimilarity, if any exists, appears purely semantic.
It seems clear that the wording of the amendment was
~ufficient to satisfy the subject matter requirements,
since all express or implied powers created by a proposed
amendrnent need not be set out. State v. Hess, 133 Ore.
91, 288 Pac. 505; Swa~in v. Tuscaloosa County, 103 So.2d
769 (...t\.la. 1958) .
There is no question but what Article VII, Section
2-! amends the Constitution by adding a new section and
ne\v subject matter, but the imperfections of title are
not those confusing of subject matter. The test is clearly
one of substantial compliances, and this having been
done, plaintiff cannot complain. Opinion of the Justices,
10-! So.2d 696 (Ala. 1958).
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The language of the Utah Supreme c·ourt is applieable to· this situation in a case where the court was also
faced with a technical claim of an erroneous title. In
Salt L.ake City v. Tax Commission, No. 9347 (10 February 1961), the Court said :
"We think that a reading of the whole title and the
\vhole act * * * may be an indictment of legislative articulation, but not legislative intent."

By the same standard, the ballot title relating to the
continuity of government may be somewhat inarticulate,
but there is no confusion as to the subject matter to be
passed on by the people.
On this basis it is submitted that no basis for disapproving the adoption of the amendment exists.
The rule is that the form of the ballot should be in
the form, if any, prescribed by the Constitution. 16
C.J.S., Consti-tutional Law, Sec. 9 However, the Utah
Constitution makes no specific requirements as to the
form of the ballot. Therefore, "on submission of a proposed constitutional amendment, all that is required to be
printed on the ballot is sufficient infor1nation to identify
the proposed amendment which the voter is voting for
or against." 16 C.J.S., p. 57; Hotard r. City of }-leu.J
Orleans, supra. In the instant case the title does not
confuse· as to the subject of the amendment and clearlY
'
.
cli~tinguishes it from other propositions
Article VII~ Section 24, therefore, \Yas properly
adopted, and the minor irregularities on the ballot that
did not relate to another subject matter are of no importance.
28
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POINT IV.
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4 OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION NOR AMEND OR CONTRADICT
ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

On the trial level and in his complaint the plaintiff
contends that the proposed constitutional amendment is
void because of a substantive reasons; that it violates
Article IV, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution, and
that it amends Article I, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, doing so without allowing a separate vote thereon.
The last contention is a procedural objection previously
answered.
Article IV, Section 4 provides in its relevant portions:
"The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this lTnion, a republican form of government
* * *"
In Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that this section was not
one 'vith which the judiciary should be concerned since
it "~as related to ''political matters." Thus the court held
it 'vas without jurisdiction to pass upon a queston raising this issue. Professor Corwin, commenting on this
provision, notes:
"''The United States' here means the governing
agency created by the Constitution, but especially
the President and Congress; for the Court has
repeatedly declared that ''That is a 'republican
form of government' is a 'political question,' and
one finally for the President and the houses to
determine 'vithin their respective spheres."
29
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Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today, 12th
Ed., p. 174.
The fact that there may be a great deal of ''direct
government" does not make a government " unrepubl"lean." Paci~fic States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118 (1912). Therefore, it is submitted that the argument
is not one that this Court may hold to void the amendment.
Nor is the present amendment in any fashion unrepublican for it provides for a continuation of representaton through persons able to carry on where otherwise
martial rule or some other military government would
be necessary. It should be noted that the amendment
applies "in periods of emergency resulting from disasters
caused by enemy attack." In Ex Parte 11/illigan, 4: ,.Vall
2 (1866), and Dtttncan v. K.ahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304
(1945), the United States Supreme Court held that as
long as the civilian courts were open and civil government was able to function, there "~as no need for military
government. A reading of the facts of these t"~o cases
reveals the unfortunate consequences that can result from
1nilitary rule. During the course of martialla"'" civilians
may be administratively ruled by the complete executive authority of the military. Fairman, The Law of
llfar·tial Rule, 2nd Ed. (1943); Civil Law, Department
of the Air Force, AFl\I 110-3, p. 289. They 111 ay be
judicially tried by provost courts or military commissions, and are not directly entitled to be treated as Inilitary personnel subject to the Uniform Code of }.filitary
Justice, and hence are denied the safeguards contained
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therein. See Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 47 ABAJ 792 (1961).
In Ex Parte lllilligan, supra, the United States Supreme
Court said of martial law:
HThat in a time of war the commander of an armed
force (if in his opinvon the exigencies of the
country demand it, and of which he is to judge),
has the power, within the lines of his military
district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to
the rule of his will; and in the exercise of his lawful authorty cannot be restrained, except by his
superior officer or the President of the United
States. If this position is sound to the extent
clamed, then when war exists, foreign or domestic, and the country is subdivided into military
departments for mere convenience, the commander
of one of them can, if he chooses, within the limits,
on the plea of necessity, with the approval of the
Executive, substitute military force for and the
exclusion of the laws, and punish all persons, as
he thinks right and proper, without fixed or certain rules. The statement of this propositon shows
its importance; for, if true, republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty
regulated by law. l\Iartial law, established on
such a basis, destroys every guaranty of the Constitution, and effectually renders the 'military
independent of and superior to the civil power.' "
Although martial law was not wholly approved, and
is not always carried so far, it is recognized as the law of
necessity, and when the "necessity" is present it may be
carried to such extremes, limited only by "necessity".
Corwin, supra, p. 122-123. Thus, if the discretion of the
military commander is limited only by "necessity", and
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the necessity in wartime is as was noted in the Minnesota
Moratorium Case, 290 U.S. 398, 426:
"[the] power to wage war, successfully, an~ thus
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of
the people in a supreme cooperative effort to
preserve the nation."
If this discretion based on "necessity" is legal, as it is
where real necessity decrees, Walker, Military Law, p.
474, et seq., then certainly the same powers are legal
where necessity decrees when exercised by civil officers
acting under approved constitutional authority.
The Executive Office of the President, Office of
Civil and Defense ~Iobilization, in the volume Continuity
of Government (1959) speaks of the purposes of the
amendment in the following terms:
''The last decade has witnessed the evolution of
the nuclear 'veapon. ~Ieanwhile, the traditionally
important military factors of time and distance
have been all but removed by the development of
ballistic missile capabilities.
The concept of modern \Yar ('vhich involves principally the doctrine of deterrence through the
strategies of 'massive retaliation' and 'counterforce f'uperiority') de1nands that 1neasures be
undertaken to increase the effectiYe defense of
our civilian society and this ~ ation ·s traditional
for1n of govern1nent. This is true prin1arilY because of the destruction "~hich "-rould result t~ our
industrial and population centers if an enen1Y
attack is thrust upon ns either throur~·h ina.dYertPll<!P or the failure of deterrence.
._
The cap~bility of thi~ Nation to survive an enemY
attar k \Vlll be determined by the state of readines.s
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of both our military and non-n1ilitary defenses.
Non-military defense is comprised of two principal elements, i.e. civil defense and defense mobilization. * * * •
The obvious need in many States for legislation
to establish a sound legal basis upon which State
and local governments can formulate their emergency government plans has prompted the Executive Office of the President, through the Office
of Civil and Defense Mobilization (wth the assistance of the Columbia Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University Council for
Ato1nic Age Studies), to prepare the suggested
legislation contained in this book. The legislation is designed to permit the States and their
political subdivisions to accomplish the first and
third of the foregoing objectives.
ln addition, the

develop~ment

of the capability by
State and local governments to continue functioning in the event of attack will assure, to the
greatest degree possible, that the invocation of
~fartial Law will not be necessary. 1\tfilitary government is the antithesis of civil government. If
the States, counties, and cities carry out a continuity of government program, they \vill make a
substantial contribution to,vard guaranteeing that
recovery of the Nation will be accomplished under
the direction of civil authority. This vvill facilitate the maintenance of the Nation in accordance
w·ith our traditional concepts of constitutional
govern1nen t."
Therefore, the amendment is directed towards preserving
the republican form of government in the face of circumstanc-es 'vhere anarchy \\"'ould otherwise reult. The plain33
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tiff has strongly attacked the portion of the amendment
which provides :

" * * * In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred the legislature shall in all respects conform
to the requirements of this Constitution ex~pt
to the extent that in the judgment of the legislature so to do would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay."
But these powers are no different than the same discretionary powers exercised in proclaiming martial law
except less severe. In addition, a reasonable standard of
"impracticability" and necessity govern their use. This
is a sufficient legal standard. Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). As was noted in Continuity of Government, p. 9:
"For another thing, the amendment itself is explicit on the matter of limitations. It lays down
the general standard that the Legislature must
conform to the Constitution of the State in all
that it does in exercise of the new powers. To be
sure, the general standard is immediately followed
by an exception under 'Yllich the Legislature is
permitted to deviate from those require1nent~
when in its judgn1ent conformitY "-ould be impracticable or "Tould admit of u~due delaY. The
fact that the deter1nina tion of the q u e ~ t i o n
-w·hether and ho"T far to deviate is entrusted to the
judgment of the Legislature "ithout recourse to
the courts (as wo~ld have been possible if the
amendment spoke In ter1ns of 'findings' bY the
~egilature) ~hould_not cause any great appr~hen
sion. There IS nothing novel in the idea that Leo-islatures ~ay. take decisi?ns, indeed final decisi;ns,
on constitutional questions. As a 1natter of fact,
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the trend in the Supreme Court of the United
States is toward a larger acceptance of the legislative judgment as to the permissible range of
legislative power. The trend is almost pronounced
in respect of legislation for the regulation of economic affairs, but it is also noticeable in respect
of legislation affecting civil liberties. Sometimes
the Court goes further and disavows jurisdiction
altogether in cases where it deems the constitutional (_1uestion more appropriate for disposition
by political rather than judicial processes. For
example, the Court will have nothing to do with
the question whether the scheme of government
set up by a State constitutes a 'republican form
of government' as guaranteed to the States by the
Constitution; rather it leaves the matter to the
attention of the political branches, Congress or
the President or both."
On this basis it must be noted that there is no substantive violation of Article IV, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution.
The claim of violation of Article I, Section 2 of the
Gtah Constitution, which provides:
"All political power is inherent in the people; and
all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and
they have the right to alter or reform their governr
ment as the public welfare may require."
is equally invalid for the same reasons set out above. It
should be noted that this p-rovision give the people the
right to "alter or reform their government as the public
"\Yelfare may require.''
This is "\Yhat Article VII, Section 24 has made provision
for in the event of necessity occasioned by enemy attack.
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This, in addition, accords with Article I, Section 1 of the
State Constitution, providing:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties."
This is the functional purpose of Article VII, Section 24,
and, therefore, no substantive objection to its provisions
exists.
The contention that Article I, Section 2 is amended
is, therefore, incorrect.

CONCLUSION
The above points have attempted to analyze the objections made by plaintiff to the adoption of Article VII,
Section 2-± of the State Constitution, raised in his complaint and argument in the proceedings before the trial
court. It is submitted that none of the matters complained
of 'York to void the amendment, and therefore, the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment declaring
Article VII, Section 24 void and of no effect. This Court
should reverse.
Respectfully submitted
'\T ALTER L. Bl~DGE
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant AttoTney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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